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Preface
This volume contains contributions to a seminar on ‘The Rise of the Christian In-
tellectual,’ and perhaps I was not only asked by the editors to write a preface
because I took part in the meeting in 2016, but also because I wrote some
years ago an article about ‘Intellectuals and Church Fathers.’ At that time I ad-
mittedly did not discuss groups of people in Rome during the early imperial pe-
riod, but rather in the Holy Land during the third and fourth centuries.¹ Never-
theless, a simple repetition of my comments from that time would be
unwarranted, not only for the reason that their focus was on late antiquity
and the East of the Roman Empire. Moreover, it seems to me now, when I reread
my remarks from that time, which were only belatedly published, that I had only
just begun to identify the problem of the use of the term ‘intellectual’ in a history
of ancient Christianity. I must therefore return to my comments at that time and
develop them in more detail.
At that time I said that the concept of Christianity as a religion characterised
by ‘intellectuals’ can be traced back in the German case—as Hans Georg Kippen-
berg has shown²—ultimately to Max Weber, who, in around 1909, was probably
the first scholar to attribute a certain role to the social class of intellectuals in the
formation of the “new religion.” In defining this role and this social class,Weber
used the term “intellectual,” which at the time was quite new. The term “intellec-
tual” itself appears to have originated in France (to be precise, during the time of
the Dreyfus affair) and was used for some time merely in a pejorative—or, at the
 C. Markschies, “Intellectuals and Church Fathers in the Third and Fourth Centuries,” in Chris-
tians and Christianity in the Holy Land: From the Origins to the Latin Kingdoms, ed. O. Limor and
G. Stroumsa (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 239–56. I’ve finished the manuscript at the end of the year
1999.
 H.G. Kippenberg, “Intellektuellen-Religion,” in Die Religion von Oberschichten: Religion—Pro-
fession—Intellektualismus, ed. P. Antes and D. Pahnke (Marburg: Diagonal, 1989), 181–202. Con-
trary to the German case “Intellectual” in its original French conception is a deeply political con-
cept (cf. P. Ory and J.-F. Sirinelli, Les intellectuels en France de l’affaire Dreyfus nos jours (Paris:
Colin, 1986): “it designates the well-educated author and thinker who is outside the government
and of threatened delegitimation.Weber ‘germanised’ the concept by neutering its political con-
tent. Instead, he ‘hegelianizes’ it: the intellectuals form part of the world historical process by
which, independently of their own personal intentions, the gradual rationalization of the
world spirit is pushed onwards” (Glen W. Most, in a letter, 10.9. 2016).
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very best, ambivalent—sense.³ In contrast, Weber’s definition has recognizably
positive connotations and is limited to the description of function: the “intellec-
tual” is, according to Weber, responsible for the rationalization and systematiza-
tion of the theory and practice of life conduct.⁴ The intellectual, according to
Weber, sees the world as a meaningful cosmos and fashions his own account
of that cosmos.⁵ With his ideas, the intellectual develops new views of the
world, which Weber apostrophizes as “Weichensteller”—that is, “points men”
on a railway line.⁶ So far, so good. This concept of “intellectual”, which is func-
tional and concentrated on “rationalization,” is entirely suitable for examining
particular traits of ancient Christian thought on the topic of religion in the impe-
rial period, as well as for describing more precisely groups of early imperial phi-
losophers.
Yet the use of the term “intellectual” as developed by Weber is by no means
unproblematic, at least for the purposes of analyzing early Christianity—and this
problem was unfortunately only partially clear to me around twenty years ago.
What are the potential problems here? First, it seems to me that Weber himself
would not have apostrophized many of the people whom will be mentioned in
this volume as “intellectuals” in the strict sense of the word. For Weber, ancient
Christianity was essentially anti-intellectual and petty bourgeois,⁷ and we will
shortly see why. Accordingly he speaks (for example, in the case of Paul) of
“petty-bourgeois intellectualism” and claims that Paul’s works represent “logical
fantasy” (instead of logically correct reasoning).⁸ According to Weber, this form
 D. Bering, Die Intellektuellen: Geschichte eines Schimpfwortes (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1982),
32–67.
 R.M. Lepsius, “Über die Institutionalisierung von Kriterien der Rationalität und die Rolle der
Intellektuellen,” in ibid., Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer,
2009), 44–52.
 M.Weber,Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und
Mächte. Nachlaß, Teilbd. 2: Religiöse Gemeinschaften, ed. H.G. Kippenberg, Max Weber-Gesam-
tausgabe I/22–2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 266–290, esp. G. Hübinger, “Intellektuelle, In-
tellektualismus,” in Max Webers ‚Religionssystematik’, ed. H.G. Kippenberg and M. Riesebrodt
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 297–314 and Peter Ghosh: Max Weber in Context: Essays in
the History of German Ideas c. 1870– 1930 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2016), 197–249 (Chapter 5:
“Max Weber and the literati”).
 M.Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften und
Reden 1915– 1920, ed. H. Schmidt-Glintzer, Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe I/19 (Tübingen: Mohr Sie-
beck, 1989), 101.
 M. Weber, Letter to Elisabeth Knauck-Kühne, 15.07.1909, in ibid., Briefe 1909– 1910, ed. M.R.
Lepsius and W.J. Mommsen, Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe II/6 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,1994),
176–8.
 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 280.
VIII Christoph Markschies
of “petty-bourgeois intellectualism” continued “in the charismatic teachers
(διδάσκαλοι).”⁹ Admittedly, at this point Weber only mentions the Epistle to
the Hebrews and refers (without footnotes and in a summary fashion) to Har-
nack’s interpretation of this now-canonical epistle. But his definition of course
also is also relevant to particular kinds of Christian teachers in the second cen-
tury. Nevertheless, Weber also seems to assume some development of less re-
stricted forms of “intellectualism” in this century when he speaks of “the intel-
lectualism of the apologists.” That “intellectualism of the apologists” is
somehow greater than and different from the “petty-bourgeois intellectualism”
of Paul. Weber does not, however, precisely describe this step from one degree
of intellectualism to the other. In any case, however,Weber argues that the apol-
ogists were not “intellectuals” in the full sense of the word. He thought of an-
cient Christianity as a “religion of redemption”¹⁰ and as such, it is and will re-
main for him in its core anti-intellectual, especially as represented by the
apologists, because here “the way to salvation does not [lead] via trained knowl-
edge.”¹¹ Weber’s reasoning produces the converse argument: unlike the apolo-
gists, ancient Gnostics were “intellectuals” to a much greater extent and in a
much more comprehensive fashion. Weber first speaks of “intellectuals” in the
full sense of the word, necessarily distanced from the church and from Christian-
ity, only when he turns to the European middle ages—and then of course in view
of the modern transformation of Christianity and finally, in particular, in view of
his own era.¹² He would presumably have considered the topic of this volume,
Christian theologians of the imperial period, an “intellectual collapse” into in-
herently anti-intellectual Christianity.¹³
A second problem with following Max Weber in using the term “intellectu-
als” is that he adopted a view of imperial Christian theology of the second cen-
tury that primarily originated from the German religious-historical school and
that few people hold today. This is entirely evident when you look at his view
of so-called Gnosticism. Weber refers to the Gnostics, as we have seen, very
much as “intellectuals” of the second century but he does not especially consid-
er them a characteristic group within ancient Christianity. In this sense, his view
fundamentally differs from Harnack, who famously understood the “Gnostics” as
 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 281.
 E. Hanke, “Erlösungsreligionen,” in Max Webers ‚Religionssystematik’, 209–26.
 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 282.
 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 283–6.
 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 283.
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the first Christian theologians.¹⁴ In contrast, “Gnosticism” for Weber constituted
in its core (as it does in the definition of Messina 1966¹⁵) a form of religion and a
way of thinking about religion that are strictly divorced from Christianity.¹⁶ Thus
we consider our second problem now somewhat more precisely: Weber’s under-
standing of ancient Gnosticism has very little to do with the understanding of the
phenomenon that has been established in recent years, not only by David
Brakke, Karen King or Michael Allen Williams.¹⁷ By this I mean not only Weber’s
firm support of an understanding of Gnosticism as being conceived in its origins
as non-Christian (and therefore also not Jewish), which stands in contrast to to-
day’s common re-contextualisation of the relevant actors in a history of ancient
Judaism and Christianity. These days we perceive as problematic Weber’s view
that there exists in Gnosticism a strong separation between a magical religion
on the one hand and the intellectual search for meaning on the other.¹⁸ In
view of Weber’s conceptual framework one can, for example, only concur with
Irenaeus and consider, for example, the Valentinian Gnostic Marcus Magus to
be a particularly anti-intellectual charlatan, but given his framework one cannot
describe him as genuinely engaging in “intellectual” consideration of religion
and ancient rationalization sui generis.¹⁹ Ultimately today we cannot assert the
 C. Markschies, Christian Theology and its Institutions in the Early Roman Empire: Prolegome-
na to a History of Early Christian Theology, transl. by W. Coppins (Waco, TX: Baylor / Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 5–20.
 “Final Document,” in The Origins of Gnosticism / Le origini dello gnosticismo: Colloquium of
Messina, 13– 18 April 1966. Texts and Discussions, ed. H. Bianchi (Leiden: Brill, 1970), XXVI-XXIX.
 H.G. Kippenberg, “Versuch einer soziologischen Verortung des antiken Gnostizismus,” in
Numen 17 (1970): 211–31; ibid., “Intellektualismus und antike Gnosis,” in Max Webers Studie
über das antike Judentum. Interpretation und Kritik, ed. W. Schluchter (Frankfurt/Main: Suhr-
kamp, 1981), 201–18.—I will deal with those matters in greater length in a larger book on Gnos-
ticism, which will appear in German language with Beck, Munich 2020, in English translation
later. The presuppositions of Weber’s image (Bousset, Reitzenstein and Troeltsch) are highlight-
ed in Kippenberg, “Intellektuellen-Religion,” 205.
 D. Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA /
London: Harvard University Press, 2010); K.L. King, What Is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, MA / Lon-
don: Harvard University Press, 2003); C. Markschies, Gnosis. An Introduction, transl. by J. Bow-
den (London/New York: T & T Clark, 2003); M.A.Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument
for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
 C. Markschies, Heilige Texte als magische Texte, in Heilige Texte: Religion und Rationalität,
ed. A. Kablitz and C. Markschies (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2013), 105–20.
 N. Förster, Marcus Magus: Kult, Lehre und Gemeindeleben einer valentinianischen Gnostiker-
gruppe. Sammlung der Quellen und Kommentar (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999); concerning so
called “Valentinian Gnosticism” cf. now Valentinianism: New Studies, ed. C. Markschies and
E. Thomassen (Leiden: Brill, 2019).
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existence of the strong cleft that Weber described between Gnostic formation of
systems on the one hand and the church’s formation of teaching practices on the
other: “dogma formation”, which, for him, “portrays self-assertion against intel-
lectualism in all its forms, is characteristic of Christianity itself.”²⁰
In view of these clear differences between the religious-historical under-
standing of ancient Christianity and ancient Gnosticism (I assume here that
one may speak of such a phenomenon faute de mieux), that Weber assumed
and the understanding subscribed to today, what remains from the concept of
“intellectual” as Weber defined it? Should one ever use this concept and/or
term in the context of ancient Christianity? I believe that one may refer to “intel-
lectuals” as a category, even if one uses the term in a somewhat different fashion
than Max Weber.²¹ On the one hand, it seems to me in any case, what remains
from Weber until today’s attempts to redefine the concept and/or term is the
functional definition of the activities of intellectuals as being the systematization
and rationalization of knowledge.²² On the other hand, however, the provocative
question remains from Weber not only for the usage of the term in German con-
texts as to whether those whom we call Christian intellectuals in the second cen-
tury are not perhaps—especially by ancient standards—better characterised as
“petty-bourgeois,” even if the lamentably flat sociological categorisation of
early imperial Christianity as “petty-bourgeois” only captures the reality of the
new religion in a limited fashion. And perhaps one could also discuss again crit-
ically Weber’s until now not mentioned idea of the de-politicised and thus apo-
litical intellectual.²³ Hans Georg Kippenberg contrasted the Epicureans and the
Gnostics in an essay that explicitly invoked Weber: both are characterised by a
distance from the political that is absent in the rest of ancient classical philoso-
 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 282.
 C. Charle, s.v. “Intellectuals, History of the Concept,” in International Encyclopedia of the So-
cial and Behavioral Sciences Vol. 11 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 7627–31 = Vol. 12, 2nd ed. (Am-
sterdam: Elsevier, 2015), 273–6; R.J. Brown, s.v. “Intellectuals, Sociology of,” in ibd., 277–82.—
Probably a non-native German never ever would deal the history of the term with such a strong
focus to Weber. But all approaches to Antiquity are always dominated by one’s one intellectual
biography.
 Concerning those terms “systematisation” and “rationalisation” cf. C. Markschies, “Introduc-
tion”, in: Rationalization in Religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, ed. Y. Friedmann and C.
Markschies on behalf of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and
the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2019), 1–4 and
ibid., “Origen of Alexandria: The Bible and Philosophical Rationality, or: Problems of Traditional
Dualisms,” in Rationalization in Religions, 63–73.
 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 269–74.
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phy.²⁴ Hubert Cancik posed some time ago the simple question of whether this
description of Epicurean and Gnostic intellectuals—which we find for example
in Hans Jonas, Kurt Rudolph and others—is really true.²⁵ This could be a reason
enough to examine once again these classic theses concerning groups of impe-
rial intellectuals.
In my initial remarks I pointed to the problems that arise when we try to
apply the concept of the “intellectual” to ancient Christian theologians during
the early Roman Empire. To summarize here: we take up a whole slew of as-
sumptions that are connected to the functionalist concept of the intellectual in
Weber. Of course, one can use this functionalist concept to describe Christian
theology in the second century, provided one is prepared to accept the reduction-
ism of this approach as regards to content. Ekkehard Mühlenberg, some time
ago, drew our attention to the costs of such an ontological reductionism,
which has in fact since been thoroughly philosophically accepted.²⁶ The concept
of the “intellectual” is like all concepts that do not originate in our sources, but
are formed much later: we cannot get away from them, we see many things more
clearly in their light, but we must not underestimate their problems and should
in no case overestimate their power. This volume, The Rise of the Christian Intel-
lectual, offers many excellent examples showing the power of this terminology!
 Kippenberg, “Versuch einer soziologischen Verortung des antiken Gnostizismus,” 215, con-
cerning Weber ibid. 223.
 H. Cancik, “Gnostiker in Rom. Zur Religionsgeschichte der Stadt Rom im 2. Jahrhundert nach
Christus,” in Gnosis und Politik. Religionstheorie und politische Theologie Vol. 2, ed. J. Taubes
(München et al.: Wilhelm Fink, 1984), 163–84, esp. 183. For the political dimension cf. above
fn. 2.
 In a review of the German version of C. Markschies, Christian Theology and its Institutions in
the Early Roman Empire, in Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 262 (2010): 230–47; some remarks
ibid., XIII-V (Introduction to the English Edition).
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